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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Bryan M. Santini appeals from two final 
decisions of the District Court for the District of New Jersey: 
(1) its September 18, 2013 decision granting summary 
judgment against him and (2) its May 6, 2014 decision 
denying his motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s 
September decision. Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-639-
JAP, 2013 WL 5554257, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2013); 
Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-639-JAP, 2014 WL 
1789545, at *4–5 (D.N.J. May 6, 2014). Appellant challenges 
only one key ruling of the District Court. Because we believe 
there are outstanding issues of material fact, we are 
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compelled to vacate in part the decisions of the District Court 
and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
 1. Santini’s Version of the Facts 
 Because we are reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees and a motion to 
reconsider that order, the following factual summary is based 
on the facts as averred by Plaintiff-Appellant Bryan Santini 
(“Santini”).1 This appeal arises from an altercation between 
Santini and several members of the New Jersey State Police 
that took place on February 3, 2009. (Deposition of Bryan 
Santini (“Santini Dep.”) 54:14–17). On that day, Santini was 
working at his family’s dairy farm in Harmony Township, 
Warren County, New Jersey, where he milked cows in the 
farm’s milk house. (Santini Dep. 58:19–59:1). Between 5:00 
and 5:30 pm that evening, a fight broke out in the farm’s milk 
house between two women—Tiffany Drake and Crystal 
Knighton. (Id. at 54:21–55:7). Santini witnessed the fight. (Id. 
at 56:12–13). There were approximately ten other witnesses 
to the fight. (Id. at 57:25–58:2). One of those witnesses called 
the police to report the incident. (Id. at 57:22–24). 
 
                                              
1 Santini’s account is primarily drawn from his sworn 
deposition, response to interrogatories, and his plea colloquy, 
all of which have been sworn to or submitted under oath. 
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 Shortly thereafter, police officers from Greenwich 
Township, Lopatcong Township, and the state police arrived 
at the Santini family farm. (Id. at 59:17–60:1). Santini 
estimates that approximately twenty officers were present; 
three to five of those officers were from the state police. (Id. 
at 60:5–13). By the time the police arrived, the fight between 
Drake and Knighton had ended. (Id. at 60:18–23). Ms. Drake 
told the police that Santini had recorded the fight on his cell 
phone. (Deposition of Trooper J. Fuhrmann (“Fuhrmann 
Dep.”) 39:5–12).2 Santini—standing outside of the milk 
house—then spoke with an officer from Greenwich Township 
to describe what he had witnessed. (Santini Dep. 61:17–21). 
  
 During that conversation, an officer from the state 
police, Trooper J.L. Fuhrmann (“Fuhrmann”), called Santini 
over. (Id. at 61:7–24). As Santini began to describe what he 
had witnessed to Fuhrmann, the Trooper yelled at Santini to 
take his hands out of his pockets. (Id. at 62:1–5). Santini 
maintains that he complied and explained that his hands were 
cold because he had been working in water all day milking 
cows. (Id. at 62:7–9). Fuhrmann responded: “I don’t care. 
Keep them where I [can] see them.” (Id. at 62:9–10). Santini 
continued his story; however, after Santini’s hands “went 
back in [his] pockets,” Fuhrmann again told Santini to keep 
his hands where the Trooper could see them. (Id. at 62:11–
18). Santini maintains that he again immediately complied 
and apologized, saying: “I’m sorry, I only have my cell phone 
and my wallet.” (Id. at 62:18–20). 
 
                                              
2 Ms. Drake subsequently denied telling the officers 
that Santini recorded the incident. However, numerous other 
sources corroborate her original story.  
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 Santini continued his story. However, while he was 
speaking, he pulled his hands into the sleeves of his 
sweatshirt. (Id. at 62:25–63:4). Santini maintains that he 
pulled his hands into his sleeves on instinct alone because his 
hands were cold. (Id. at 63:12–14). At that point, Fuhrmann 
yelled at Santini about his hands for the fourth time. (Id. at 
63:4–5; 64:20–21). In response, Santini told Fuhrmann that 
he was going to return to work because he had already told 
the other officers his story. (Id. at 64:20–24). Santini then 
began to walk back to the milk house. (Id. at 64:23–24). At 
that point, Fuhrmann said “[c]ome here” and grabbed 
Santini’s right wrist. (Id. at 65:1–13). The two men fell to the 
ground, where Santini landed on his side and then rolled onto 
his stomach. (Id. at 65:14–21). As Santini struggled to return 
to his feet, one officer—who Santini believes was 
Fuhrmann—jumped on top of Santini and told him to put his 
hands behind his back because he was under arrest. (Id. at 
65:23–66:3).  
 
 As that officer spoke, other officers were on top of 
Santini, punching him and beating him with nightsticks. (Id. 
at 66:3–6). At the time, Santini’s hands were pinned beneath 
his body. (Id. at 66:7–10). While Santini was facedown, the 
officers surrounding him instructed Santini to stop resisting. 
(Id. at 67:21–24). Santini understood that their instruction 
meant for him to remove his hands from beneath his stomach. 
(Id. at 67:25–68:9). In his deposition, Santini states that he 
was unable to remove his arms because of the weight of the 
officers on top of him. (Id.). However, in Santini’s plea 
colloquy, he admitted that he resisted arrest. (Santini Plea 
Colloquy3 8:22–9:8). 
                                              
3 Santini’s Plea Colloquy begins at page 79 of the 
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 An officer then sprayed Santini with pepper spray. 
(Santini Dep. 67:10–12; 68:12–22).4 Santini states that he was 
sprayed for thirty seconds to one minute and that two bottles 
of spray were used. (Id. at 68:15–22). After the pepper spray 
was used, the officers were no longer on top of Santini, he 
was able to free his arms, and he was subsequently 
handcuffed. (Id. at 68:20–22). After handcuffing Santini, the 
officers ceased punching, kicking, hitting with batons, and 
pepper spraying him. (Id. at 69:10–16). Santini was then 
taken to Warren County Jail. (Id. at 78:22–23). There, Santini 
was treated with Tylenol and eye drops. (Id. at 79:5–6). He 
maintains that he had “marks everywhere” after the incident. 
(Id. at 79:2). However, his medical records from the incident 
reveal no permanent or lasting injuries. (See generally App. 
125–45). 
 
 2. The Troopers’ Version of the Facts 
 The Troopers’ story differs from Santini’s in three 
ways.5 First, they maintain that Santini was not cooperative 
                                                                                                     
Appendix. 
 
4 Santini cannot identify exactly which officers 
punched him, hit him with batons, or pepper sprayed him. 
(Santini Dep. 66–67). 
 
5 The Troopers’ account is primarily drawn from the 
depositions of Troopers Fuhrmann and Sickles, both of which 
have been sworn to or submitted under oath, and also from 
the Supplemental Investigations Report prepared by each 
Trooper. 
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with Fuhrmann during the exchange between the two men. 
(Fuhrmann Dep. 39:14–40:6). They maintain that Santini 
refused to look at Fuhrmann while Fuhrmann questioned him. 
(Id.). They also claim that Santini never mentioned that his 
hands were cold from milking cows. (Id. at 46:6–10). Second, 
the Defendants maintain that the physical altercation between 
Santini and Fuhrmann began when Santini resisted 
Fuhrmann’s attempt to remove Santini’s hands from his 
pockets. (App. 197). Notably, they assert that during the 
“grasping match” between the two men, Santini struck 
Fuhrmann with an open palm on the right shoulder. (Id.).6 
Third and finally, the Defendants allege that as Santini 
resisted Fuhrmann’s attempts to control his hands, Santini 
tackled Fuhrmann and grabbed his right leg, bringing the two 
men to the ground. (Id.; Fuhrmann Dep. 51). 
  
 3. State Court Proceedings Against Santini 
 As a result of his arrest, Santini was brought before a 
Grand Jury in Warren County, New Jersey on May 13, 2009. 
(App. 124). The Grand Jury returned a True Bill against 
Santini, and he was indicted for aggravated assault under 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1b(5)(a). (Id.). In August of 2009—two 
days before a scheduled pretrial conference—the State 
brought two additional charges against Santini: obstruction of 
justice and resisting arrest. (Santini Plea Colloquy 3).  On 
August 12, 2009, Santini pleaded guilty to the resisting arrest 
charge only; the aggravated assault and obstruction of justice 
charges were dismissed as part of his plea agreement. (Id. at 
3–4). During his plea colloquy, Santini admitted that while he 
                                              
6 Fuhrmann does not make any reference to this open 
palm contact in his deposition. 
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was on the ground with various officers on top of him, he 
resisted their efforts to pull his arms out from beneath him. 
(Id. at 8:22–9:8). 
 
 4. Federal Proceedings 
On February 3, 2011, Santini filed a six-count 
Complaint in federal district court for the District of New 
Jersey alleging that his rights under the federal Constitution, 
the New Jersey state constitution, and New Jersey state law 
were violated by members of the Greenwich Township, 
Lopatcong Township, and New Jersey State police forces. 
Specifically, the Complaint alleged (1) violations of Santini’s 
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, (2) a 
violation of N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2, (3) violations of the New 
Jersey state constitution, (4) false imprisonment, false arrest, 
and malicious prosecution, (5) civil conspiracy, and (6) a 
violation of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (N.J.S.A. § 59:1-
1 et seq.). On September 12, 2011, the District Court 
dismissed some of the named defendants7—leaving Troopers 
Fuhrmann and Sickles (together, “the Trooper Defendants”), 
Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes, and the State of New Jersey as the 
only remaining defendants. 
 
On September 18, 2013, the District Court issued a 
final order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Trooper Defendants and the State of New Jersey and 
                                              
7 The following defendants were dismissed with 
prejudice: Defendants Greenwich Township, Sergeant David 
Voll, Patrolman Dennis Cahill, Chief Richard Guzzo, 
Lopatcong Township, Detective Michael Patricia, and Chief 
Scott Marinelli. 
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dismissing the case. Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-639-
JAP, 2013 WL 5554257, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2013). The 
District Court dismissed Santini’s federal claims8 finding that 
(1) the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) 
no individual defendant was a “person” under §§ 1983, 1985; 
(3) defendants could defeat Santini’s claims for malicious 
prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment; (4) § 1983 
precludes recovery solely on the basis of respondeat superior; 
and (5) the Trooper Defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity. Id. at *4–5 & n.3. The District Court then declined 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Santini’s remaining 
state law claims (Counts II, III, and VI). Id. at *5. 
 
 Santini filed a motion asking the District Court to 
reconsider granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Trooper Defendants in their individual capacities as to Counts 
I–III of the Complaint.9 Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-
639-JAP, 2014 WL 1789545, at *1 (D.N.J. May 6, 2014). 
Santini argued that questions of material fact existed as to 
whether excessive force was used against Santini. Id. at *2. 
The District Court denied that motion in an Order dated May 
                                              
8 The District Court characterized three counts as 
federal: Count I (alleging violations of civil rights under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments), Count IV (alleging false imprisonment, false 
arrest, and malicious prosecution), and Count V (alleging 
civil conspiracy).  
9 Santini did not mention the State of New Jersey in his 
motion for reconsideration. Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 
11-639-JAP, 2014 WL 1789545, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. May 6, 
2014). 
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6, 2014. Id. at *4–5. This timely appeal followed. On appeal, 
Santini’s arguments mirror those found in his motion for 
reconsideration—namely that summary judgment against the 
Trooper Defendants in their individual capacities was 
inappropriate because there are genuine issues of material fact 
related to Santini’s claim that excessive force was used 
against him by the Trooper Defendants. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION10 
 1.  Standard of Review  
 This Court exercises plenary review over a district 
court order granting summary judgment. Bushman v. Halm, 
798 F.2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 1986). Therefore, our review is 
identical to the review performed by the district court. Id. 
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is 
“material” under Rule 56 if its existence or nonexistence 
might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable 
substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if 
“a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.” Id. 
  
                                              
10 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear Santini’s 
federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 
1343(a)(3). It had jurisdiction over his state law claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction to review 
final orders of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 The moving party bears the burden of identifying 
specific portions of the record that establish the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, 
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the 
pleadings and “come forward with ‘specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). When determining a motion 
for summary judgment, we must construe all evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. 
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). We are also mindful 
that “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence 
and determine the truth of the matter but to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 
at 249. 
  
 We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration 
for abuse of discretion. Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, 
Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 
 2. Background: Qualified Immunity 
 Santini argues on appeal that the District Court erred in 
finding that the Trooper Defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity with respect to his federal claims. Santini’s federal 
claims primarily arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
provides a cause of action to any individual who has been 
deprived of his rights under the Constitution or other federal 
laws by a person acting “under color of law.” Curley v. Klem, 
499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2007). “Police officers, 
embodying the authority of the state, are liable under § 1983 
when they violate someone’s constitutional rights, unless they 
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are protected by qualified immunity.” Id. The doctrine of 
qualified immunity shields government officials who perform 
discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982). The purpose of qualified immunity is to “avoid 
excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution 
of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.”  Id.  
 
 This Court performs a two-step inquiry to determine 
whether a particular government official is entitled to 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. First, we 
ask whether the facts—taken in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party—show that a government official violated a 
constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 
(2001). Second, we ask whether that right was clearly 
established at the time of the official’s actions. Id. This two-
step process has more particularized requirements in an 
excessive force case such as this one.  
 
 In an excessive force case, we determine whether a 
constitutional violation has occurred using the Fourth 
Amendment’s objective reasonableness test. Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Curley, 499 F.3d at 206–
07. To determine objective reasonableness, we must balance 
the “nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing 
governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 390 U.S. at 396 
(quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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 While this inquiry is highly individualized and fact 
specific, the Supreme Court has provided three factors to 
guide us through it: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) 
whether the suspect poses an imminent threat to the safety of 
the police or others in the vicinity, and (3) whether the 
suspect attempts to resist arrest or flee the scene. Graham, 
390 U.S. at 396; see also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 
822 (3d Cir. 1997) (providing additional factors including 
“the possibility that the persons subject to the police action 
are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the 
action, whether the action takes place in the context of 
effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be 
armed, and the number of persons with whom the police 
officers must contend at one time”). We evaluate objective 
reasonableness from the perspective of the officer at the time 
of the incident and not with the benefit of hindsight. 
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). In sum, we 
employ a “totality of the circumstances” approach for 
evaluating objective reasonableness. Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. 
  
 During the second step of the Saucier inquiry, we 
inquire whether—even though an officer violated an 
individual’s constitutional right—immunity should still 
protect that officer from liability. Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. To 
answer that question, we must determine whether the right 
violated by the officer was clearly established at the time of 
the violation. Id. (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). To make 
that determination, we engage in another reasonableness 
inquiry: “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer 
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” 
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Like the reasonableness inquiry 
conducted in step one, this inquiry is objective and fact 
specific. Despite these similarities, the step two inquiry is 
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distinct from the inquiry conducted in step one. Id. at 205. 
Saucier highlighted this distinction by noting that the purpose 
of the step two inquiry is to acknowledge the reality that 
“reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints 
on particular police conduct.” Curley, 499 F.3d at 207 
(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). Put another way, 
  
[T]he first step of the analysis addresses whether the 
force used by the officer was excessive, and therefore 
violative of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or 
whether it was reasonable in light of the facts and 
circumstances available to the officer at the time. This 
is not a question of immunity at all, but is instead the 
underlying question of whether there is even a wrong 
to be addressed in an analysis of immunity. The 
second step is the immunity analysis and addresses 
whether, if there was a wrong, such as the use of 
excessive force, the officer made a reasonable mistake 
about the legal constraints on his actions and should . . 
. be protected against suit[.] 
Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. 
 Saucier mandated that its two-step inquiry be 
performed in sequential order, Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 
which created “perplexing logical and practical” issues for the 
lower courts, Curley, 499 F.3d at 208. The Supreme Court 
remedied those issues in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 
236 (2009). After Pearson, district and appellate courts have 
discretion to perform the Saucier inquiry in the order we 
deem most appropriate for the particular case before us. Id. 
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 3. The District Court’s Decision 
 Here, the District Court made only a fleeting reference 
to qualified immunity in its September 18, 2013 Opinion: 
 
It should be noted that, in finding Plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights were not violated, Troopers 
Fuhrmann and Sickles are entitled to qualified 
immunity  on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. However, 
the Court need not analyze this issue[, qualified 
immunity,] because for the reasons set forth above, 
Defendants’ [sic] are already entitled to judgment on 
Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims. 
Santini, 2013 WL 5554257, at *5 n.3 (citation omitted).11 It 
addressed qualified immunity in more detail in its May 6, 
2014 Opinion denying Santini’s motion for reconsideration. 
In that opinion, the District Court found that Santini did not 
satisfy the first step of the Saucier inquiry: establishing that a 
constitutional violation occurred. Santini, 2014 WL 1789545, 
at *3–4. Based on that finding, the court did not proceed to 
                                              
11 This footnote demonstrates the District Court’s 
initial misunderstanding as to the scope of two of its findings: 
(1) that § 1983 cannot override the Eleventh Amendment’s 
prohibition of suits against government officials in their 
official capacity and (2) that government officials acting in 
their official capacity are not “persons” under § 1983. Both of 
these findings extend only to government officials acting in 
their official—as opposed to individual—capacity. Santini’s 
Complaint explicitly stated that he was bringing charges 
against the Trooper Defendants in their official and individual 
capacities. (Complaint ¶¶ 2–4). 
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the second Saucier step. Id. The District Court relied on two 
facts to find that Santini’s constitutional rights were not 
violated: “Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that he refused to 
take his hands out of his pockets despite Trooper Fuhrmann’s 
instructions to do so, and further admits the fact that he 
attempted to resist arrest.” Id. at *4.  
 
 For the reasons detailed below, we find that while the 
District Court stated the appropriate test to determine 
qualified immunity, it failed to properly construe all facts and 
inferences in Santini’s favor. As our analysis below shows, 
when all facts and inferences are taken in Santini’s favor, a 
reasonable factfinder could find that Santini’s constitutional 
rights were violated. Therefore, the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on that issue was inappropriate. We 
accordingly vacate in part the court’s decisions dated 
September 18, 2013 and May 6, 2014 and remand them for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 4. Analysis 
 At the outset, we emphasize that in reviewing an order 
granting summary judgment, we must construe all facts and 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—in this case: 
Santini. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 
(1962). 
  
 We have discretion to perform the two steps of the 
Saucier qualified immunity inquiry in the order we deem 
appropriate. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We proceed first with 
the constitutional violation inquiry to remain consistent with 
the District Court’s May 6, 2014 Opinion. We employ the 
Graham totality of the circumstances test and begin with an 
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analysis of (1) the severity of Santini’s crime, (2) whether 
Santini posed an imminent threat to the safety of the police or 
others in the vicinity, and (3) whether Santini attempted to 
resist arrest or flee the scene. Graham, 390 U.S. at 396. 
  
 Construing all facts in Santini’s favor, a reasonable 
jury could find that the severity of crime factor weighs in his 
favor. The police arrived to the Santini family farm in order 
to investigate a fight between two women—not any sort of 
criminal activity on the part of Santini. Accordingly, Santini 
was initially only a witness to, not a suspect of, a crime. 
Nevertheless, after the altercation with Fuhrmann, Santini 
was charged with aggravated assault under N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-
1b(5)(a), a fourth degree crime in New Jersey. (App. 222).12 
However, under Santini’s version of the facts, he did not 
commit that offense. (See Santini Dep. 65–66).13 Further, the 
                                              
12 “Crimes are classified by degree. Degrees range 
from first to fourth degree offenses. A First degree crime 
carries the potential penalty of 10-20 years in prison. A 
Second degree crime carries a potential penalty of 5-10 
years. Defendants who are convicted of first and second 
degree crimes face a presumptive term of incarceration. It is 
assumed that they will be sentenced to serve time in prison. A 
Third degree crime may result in 3-5 years if convicted, 
while Fourth degree crimes carry a potential penalty of up to 
18 months in jail. There is a presumption of non-custodial 
sentences on 3rd and 4th degree offenses.” The Criminal 
Justice Process, NEW JERSEY COURTS, available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/crproc.htm.  
 
13 The Eastern District of Michigan confronted a case 
with some similarities to Santini’s in Cervantes v. Torbett, 
18 
 
aggravated assault charge was subsequently dropped. (Santini 
Plea Colloquy 4). Ultimately, Santini pleaded guilty to one 
count of resisting arrest, a disorderly persons offense in New 
Jersey.14 
 
 Under Santini’s averment of the facts, a reasonable 
jury could also find that the imminent threat factor weighs in 
his favor. We again emphasize that at the beginning of 
Santini’s encounter with the police, he was not suspected of 
criminal activity. Santini does admit that he did not obey 
Fuhrmann’s commands to keep his hands in plain sight. 
However, under our totality of the circumstances approach, 
this fact does not compel us to find against Santini. First, 
Santini maintains that he initially complied with each of 
Fuhrmann’s requests to show his hands. Moreover, he 
contends that he explained to Fuhrmann that he was only 
covering his hands because they were cold. His action of 
                                                                                                     
No. 08-14390, 2010 WL 743045 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 1, 2010) 
(unpublished). There, the district court found that the severity 
of crime factor weighed in favor of the plaintiff—who was 
also the nonmoving party on a motion for summary 
judgment—where she was charged with assaulting an officer, 
but, under her version of the facts, an assault never occurred. 
Cervantes, 2010 WL 743045, at *7. 
 
14 Disorderly persons offenses “carry less restrictive 
punishments upon conviction.” The Criminal Justice Process, 
NEW JERSEY COURTS, available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/crproc.htm. In New 
Jersey, a resisting arrest conviction carries with it a maximum 
of six months in prison and a $1,000 fine. (Santini Plea 
Colloquy 6). 
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balling his hands into his sleeves is consistent with that 
explanation. Finally, the police, including Fuhrmann, initially 
wanted to speak to Santini because they believed he had 
recorded the incident between Drake and Knighton on his cell 
phone. During their conversation, Santini informed Fuhrmann 
that he had his cell phone in his pocket. Therefore, to the 
extent that Fuhrmann observed a hard object in Santini’s 
pocket, a jury could find that an objectively reasonable officer 
in his position would have thought that object was Santini’s 
phone. This inference is further supported by the absence of 
other facts suggesting that Santini was armed or otherwise 
posed a threat to officer safety. 
 
 The final Graham factor—whether the suspect 
attempts to resist arrest or flee the scene—is somewhat 
inconclusive in this case. While Santini did admit to resisting 
arrest in his plea colloquy (Santini Plea Colloquy 8:22–9:8), 
his resistance was not violent.15  
 
 Under Graham, we ultimately weigh the invasion on 
Santini’s individual rights against the interests of the Trooper 
Defendants. Under Santini’s version of the facts, this balance 
                                              
15 A reasonable jury could also find under Santini’s 
version of the facts that several of the Sharrar v. Felsing 
factors weigh in Santini’s favor. For example, there was a 
limited possibility that Santini was violent, as he was only a 
witness to—rather than a suspect of—a crime. Further, by the 
time Fuhrmann was speaking with Santini, the fight between 
Drake and Knighton had ceased and the situation was calm. 
Trooper Fuhrmann had no other individuals to contend with 
other than witnesses, and there were multiple other officers at 
the scene.  
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tips in his favor. Again, taking all facts and inferences in his 
favor, the infringement on Santini’s rights was great: he was 
grabbed, tackled, punched, kicked, and pepper sprayed. 
Conversely, there was only limited justification for the 
government’s actions as Santini was a witness to a crime, he 
did not threaten violence against the officer, the scene that the 
officers were confronted with was peaceful at the time of the 
Santini interaction, and there were many officers at the scene. 
 
 Therefore, material factual disputes exist as to whether 
Santini’s constitutional rights were violated. The existence of 
those disputes compels us to find that the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment was inappropriate, as was its 
denial of Santini’s motion to reconsider that decision. See 
Curley, 298 F.3d at 278 (“Just as the granting of summary 
judgment is inappropriate when a genuine issue exists as to 
any material fact, a decision on qualified immunity will be 
premature when there are unresolved disputes of historical 
fact relevant to the immunity analysis.”). We also find that 
those factual issues must be resolved by a jury, not a judge. 
See id. (“[T]he existence of disputed, historical facts material 
to the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct will 
give rise to a jury issue.”). We accordingly vacate in part the 
decisions of the District Court and remand this case for 
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.  
 
 5. Santini’s State Law Claims 
 The District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Santini’s state law claims based on its 
dismissal of his federal claims. We instruct the court to 
reconsider that decision on remand based upon its resolution 
of Santini’s federal claims.  
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III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate in part the 
decisions of the District Court dated September 18, 2013 and 
May 6, 2014 and remand them for further proceedings 
consistent with this Opinion.  
